Article: Demography: China’s Achilles heel | The Economist

Demography: China’s Achilles heel | The Economist
http://www.economist.com/node/21553056/print


LIKE the hero of “The Iliad”, China can seem invincible. In 2010 it overtook America in terms of manufactured output, energy use and car sales. Its military spending has been growing in nominal terms by an average of 16% each year for the past 20 years. According to the IMF, China will overtake America as the world’s largest economy (at purchasing-power parity) in 2017. But when Thetis, Achilles’s mother, dipped her baby in the river Styx to give him the gift of invulnerability, she had to hold him somewhere. Alongside the other many problems it faces, China too has its deadly point of unseen weakness: demography.

Over the past 30 years, China’s total fertility rate—the number of children a woman can expect to have during her lifetime—has fallen from 2.6, well above the rate needed to hold a population steady, to 1.56, well below that rate (see table). Because very low fertility can become self-reinforcing, with children of one-child families wanting only one child themselves, China now probably faces a long period of ultra-low fertility, regardless of what happens to its one-child policy.

The government has made small adjustments to the policy (notably by allowing an only child who is married to another only child to have more than one child) and may adapt it further. But for now it is firmly in place, and very low fertility rates still prevail, especially in the richest parts of the country. Shanghai reported fertility of just 0.6 in 2010—probably the lowest level anywhere in the world. According to the UN’s population division, the nationwide fertility rate will continue to decline, reaching 1.51 in 2015-20. In contrast, America’s fertility rate is 2.08 and rising.

The difference between 1.56 and 2.08 does not sound large. But over the long term it has a huge impact on society. Between now and 2050 China’s population will fall slightly, from 1.34 billion in 2010 to just under 1.3 billion in 2050. This assumes that fertility starts to recover. If it stays low, the population will dip below 1 billion by 2060. In contrast, America’s population is set to rise by 30% in the next 40 years. China will hit its peak population in 2026. No one knows when America will hit its population peak.

The differences between the two countries are even more striking if you look at their average ages. In 1980 China’s median (the age at which half the population is younger, half older) was 22. That is characteristic of a young developing country. It is now 34.5, more like a rich country and not very different from America’s, which is 37. But China is ageing at an unprecedented pace. Because fewer children are being born as larger generations of adults are getting older, its median age will rise to 49 by 2050, nearly nine years more than America at that point. Some cities will be older still. The Shanghai Population and Family Planning Committee says that more than a third of the city’s population will be over 60 by 2020.

This trend will have profound financial and social consequences. Most obviously, it means China will have a bulge of pensioners before it has developed the means of looking after them. Unlike the rest of the developed world, China will grow old before it gets rich. Currently, 8.2% of China’s total population is over 65. The equivalent figure in America is 13%. By 2050, China’s share will be 26%, higher than in America.

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In the traditional Chinese family, children, especially sons, look after their parents (though this is now changing—see story on next page). But rapid ageing also means China faces what is called the “4-2-1 phenomenon”: each only child is responsible for two parents and four grandparents. Even with high savings rates, it seems unlikely that the younger generation will be able or willing to afford such a burden. So most elderly Chinese will be obliged to rely heavily on social-security pensions.

China set up a national pensions fund in 2000, but only about 365m people have a formal pension. And the system is in crisis. The country’s unfunded pension liability is roughly 150% of GDP. Almost half the (separate) pension funds run by provinces are in the red, and local governments have sometimes reneged on payments.

But that is only part of a wider problem. Between 2010 and 2050 China’s workforce will shrink as a share of the population by 11 percentage points, from 72% to 61%—a huge contraction, even allowing for the fact that the workforce share is exceptionally large now. That means China’s old-age dependency ratio (which compares the number of people over 65 with those aged 15 to 64) will soar. At the moment the ratio is 11—roughly half America’s level of 20. But by 2050, China’s old-age ratio will have risen fourfold to 42, surpassing America’s. Even more strikingly, by 2050, the number of people coming towards the end of their working lives (ie, those in their 50s) will have risen by more than 10%. The number of those just setting out (those in their early 20s, who are usually the best educated and most productive members of society) will have halved.

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The shift spells the end of China as the world’s factory. The apparently endless stream of cheap labour is starting to run dry. Despite pools of underemployed country-dwellers, China already faces shortages of manual workers. As the workforce starts to shrink after 2013, these problems will worsen. Sarah Harper of the Oxford Institute of Population Ageing points out that China has mapped out the age structure of its jobs, and knows for each occupation when the skills shortage will hit. It is likely to try to offset the impact by looking for workers abroad. Manpower, a business-recruitment firm, says that by 2030 China will be importing workers from outside, rather than exporting them.

Large-scale immigration poses problems of its own. America is one of the rare examples of a country that has managed to use mass immigration to build a skilled labour force. But America is an open, multi-ethnic society with a long history of immigration and strong legal and political institutions. China has none of these features.

In the absence of predictable institutions, all areas of Chinese society have relied on guanxi, the web of connections that often has extended family relations at the centre. But what happens when there are fewer extended families? One result could be a move towards a more predictable legal system and (possibly) a more open political culture. And, as shifts in China’s economy lead to lower growth, Chinese leaders will have to make difficult spending choices; they will have to decide whether to buy “guns or walking sticks”.

China is not unique in facing these problems. All rich countries have rising pension costs. And China has some advantages in dealing with them, notably low tax rates (giving room for future increases) and low public expectations of welfare. Still, China is also unusual in two respects. It is much poorer than other ageing countries, and its demographic transition has been much more abrupt. It seems highly unlikely that China will be able to grow its way economically out of its population problems. Instead, those problems will weigh down its growth rate—to say nothing of the immense social challenges they will bring. China’s Achilles heel will not be fatal. But it will hobble the hero.


Article: Homophobic? Maybe You’re Gay - NYTimes.com

Homophobic? Maybe You’re Gay - NYTimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/opinion/sunday/homophobic-maybe-youre-gay.html?pagewanted=print


WHY are political and religious figures who campaign against gay rights so often implicated in sexual encounters with same-sex partners?

In recent years, Ted Haggard, an evangelical leader who preached that homosexuality was a sin, resigned after a scandal involving a former male prostitute; Larry Craig, a United States senator who opposed including sexual orientation in hate-crime legislation, was arrested on suspicion of lewd conduct in a men’s bathroom; and Glenn Murphy Jr., a leader of the Young Republican National Convention and an opponent of same-sex marriage, pleaded guilty to a lesser charge after being accused of sexually assaulting another man.

One theory is that homosexual urges, when repressed out of shame or fear, can be expressed as homophobia. Freud famously called this process a “reaction formation” — the angry battle against the outward symbol of feelings that are inwardly being stifled. Even Mr. Haggard seemed to endorse this idea when, apologizing after his scandal for his anti-gay rhetoric, he said, “I think I was partially so vehement because of my own war.”

It’s a compelling theory — and now there is scientific reason to believe it. In this month’s issue of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, we and our fellow researchers provide empirical evidence that homophobia can result, at least in part, from the suppression of same-sex desire.

Our paper describes six studies conducted in the United States and Germany involving 784 university students. Participants rated their sexual orientation on a 10-point scale, ranging from gay to straight. Then they took a computer-administered test designed to measure their implicit sexual orientation. In the test, the participants were shown images and words indicative of hetero- and homosexuality (pictures of same-sex and straight couples, words like “homosexual” and “gay”) and were asked to sort them into the appropriate category, gay or straight, as quickly as possible. The computer measured their reaction times.

The twist was that before each word and image appeared, the word “me” or “other” was flashed on the screen for 35 milliseconds — long enough for participants to subliminally process the word but short enough that they could not consciously see it. The theory here, known as semantic association, is that when “me” precedes words or images that reflect your sexual orientation (for example, heterosexual images for a straight person), you will sort these images into the correct category faster than when “me” precedes words or images that are incongruent with your sexual orientation (for example, homosexual images for a straight person). This technique, adapted from similar tests used to assess attitudes like subconscious racial bias, reliably distinguishes between self-identified straight individuals and those who self-identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual.

Using this methodology we identified a subgroup of participants who, despite self-identifying as highly straight, indicated some level of same-sex attraction (that is, they associated “me” with gay-related words and pictures faster than they associated “me” with straight-related words and pictures). Over 20 percent of self-described highly straight individuals showed this discrepancy.

Notably, these “discrepant” individuals were also significantly more likely than other participants to favor anti-gay policies; to be willing to assign significantly harsher punishments to perpetrators of petty crimes if they were presumed to be homosexual; and to express greater implicit hostility toward gay subjects (also measured with the help of subliminal priming). Thus our research suggests that some who oppose homosexuality do tacitly harbor same-sex attraction.

What leads to this repression? We found that participants who reported having supportive and accepting parents were more in touch with their implicit sexual orientation and less susceptible to homophobia. Individuals whose sexual identity was at odds with their implicit sexual attraction were much more frequently raised by parents perceived to be controlling, less accepting and more prejudiced against homosexuals.

It’s important to stress the obvious: Not all those who campaign against gay men and lesbians secretly feel same-sex attractions. But at least some who oppose homosexuality are likely to be individuals struggling against parts of themselves, having themselves been victims of oppression and lack of acceptance. The costs are great, not only for the targets of anti-gay efforts but also often for the perpetrators. We would do well to remember that all involved deserve our compassion.

Richard M. Ryan is a professor of psychology, psychiatry and education at the University of Rochester. William S. Ryan is a doctoral student in psychology at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

NYTimes: How Exercise Could Lead to a Better Brain


http://nyti.ms/IYbfmM

How Exercise Could Lead to a Better Brain

The value of mental-training games may be speculative, as Dan Hurley writes in his article on the quest to make ourselves smarter, but there is another, easy-to-achieve, scientifically proven way to make yourself smarter. Go for a walk or a swim. For more than a decade, neuroscientists and physiologists have been gathering evidence of the beneficial relationship between exercise and brainpower. But the newest findings make it clear that this isn’t just a relationship; it is the relationship. Using sophisticated technologies to examine the workings of individual neurons — and the makeup of brain matter itself — scientists in just the past few months have discovered that exercise appears to build a brain that resists physical shrinkage and enhance cognitive flexibility. Exercise, the latest neuroscience suggests, does more to bolster thinking than thinking does.

The most persuasive evidence comes from several new studies of lab animals living in busy, exciting cages. It has long been known that so-called “enriched” environments — homes filled with toys and engaging, novel tasks — lead to improvements in the brainpower of lab animals. In most instances, such environmental enrichment also includes a running wheel, because mice and rats generally enjoy running. Until recently, there was little research done to tease out the particular effects of running versus those of playing with new toys or engaging the mind in other ways that don’t increase the heart rate.

So, last year a team of researchers led by Justin S. Rhodes, a psychology professor at the Beckman Institute for Advanced Science and Technology at the University of Illinois, gathered four groups of mice and set them into four distinct living arrangements. One group lived in a world of sensual and gustatory plenty, dining on nuts, fruits and cheeses, their food occasionally dusted with cinnamon, all of it washed down with variously flavored waters. Their “beds” were colorful plastic igloos occupying one corner of the cage. Neon-hued balls, plastic tunnels, nibble-able blocks, mirrors and seesaws filled other parts of the cage. Group 2 had access to all of these pleasures, plus they had small disc-shaped running wheels in their cages. A third group’s cages held no embellishments, and they received standard, dull kibble. And the fourth group’s homes contained the running wheels but no other toys or treats.

All the animals completed a series of cognitive tests at the start of the study and were injected with a substance that allows scientists to track changes in their brain structures. Then they ran, played or, if their environment was unenriched, lolled about in their cages for several months.

Afterward, Rhodes’s team put the mice through the same cognitive tests and examined brain tissues. It turned out that the toys and tastes, no matter how stimulating, had not improved the animals’ brains.

“Only one thing had mattered,” Rhodes says, “and that’s whether they had a running wheel.” Animals that exercised, whether or not they had any other enrichments in their cages, had healthier brains and performed significantly better on cognitive tests than the other mice. Animals that didn’t run, no matter how enriched their world was otherwise, did not improve their brainpower in the complex, lasting ways that Rhodes’s team was studying. “They loved the toys,” Rhodes says, and the mice rarely ventured into the empty, quieter portions of their cages. But unless they also exercised, they did not become smarter.

Why would exercise build brainpower in ways that thinking might not? The brain, like all muscles and organs, is a tissue, and its function declines with underuse and age. Beginning in our late 20s, most of us will lose about 1 percent annually of the volume of the hippocampus, a key portion of the brain related to memory and certain types of learning.

Exercise though seems to slow or reverse the brain’s physical decay, much as it does with muscles. Although scientists thought until recently that humans were born with a certain number of brain cells and would never generate more, they now know better. In the 1990s, using a technique that marks newborn cells, researchers determined during autopsies that adult human brains contained quite a few new neurons. Fresh cells were especially prevalent in the hippocampus, indicating that neurogenesis — or the creation of new brain cells — was primarily occurring there. Even more heartening, scientists found that exercise jump-starts neurogenesis. Mice and rats that ran for a few weeks generally had about twice as many new neurons in their hippocampi as sedentary animals. Their brains, like other muscles, were bulking up.

But it was the ineffable effect that exercise had on the functioning of the newly formed neurons that was most startling. Brain cells can improve intellect only if they join the existing neural network, and many do not, instead rattling aimlessly around in the brain for a while before dying.

One way to pull neurons into the network, however, is to learn something. In a 2007 study, new brain cells in mice became looped into the animals’ neural networks if the mice learned to navigate a water maze, a task that is cognitively but not physically taxing. But these brain cells were very limited in what they could do. When the researchers studied brain activity afterward, they found that the newly wired cells fired only when the animals navigated the maze again, not when they practiced other cognitive tasks. The learning encoded in those cells did not transfer to other types of rodent thinking.

Exercise, on the other hand, seems to make neurons nimble. When researchers in a separate study had mice run, the animals’ brains readily wired many new neurons into the neural network. But those neurons didn’t fire later only during running. They also lighted up when the animals practiced cognitive skills, like exploring unfamiliar environments. In the mice, running, unlike learning, had created brain cells that could multitask.

Just how exercise remakes minds on a molecular level is not yet fully understood, but research suggests that exercise prompts increases in something called brain-derived neurotropic factor, or B.D.N.F., a substance that strengthens cells and axons, fortifies the connections among neurons and sparks neurogenesis. Scientists can’t directly study similar effects in human brains, but they have found that after workouts, most people display higher B.D.N.F. levels in their bloodstreams.

Few if any researchers think that more B.D.N.F. explains all of the brain changes associated with exercise. The full process almost certainly involves multiple complex biochemical and genetic cascades. A recent study of the brains of elderly mice, for instance, found 117 genes that were expressed differently in the brains of animals that began a program of running, compared with those that remained sedentary, and the scientists were looking at only a small portion of the many genes that might be expressed differently in the brain by exercise.

Whether any type of exercise will produce these desirable effects is another unanswered and intriguing issue. “It’s not clear if the activity has to be endurance exercise,” says the psychologist and neuroscientist Arthur F. Kramer, director of the Beckman Institute at the University of Illinois and a pre-eminent expert on exercise and the brain. A limited number of studies in the past several years have found cognitive benefits among older people who lifted weights for a year and did not otherwise exercise. But most studies to date, and all animal experiments, have involved running or other aerobic activities.

Whatever the activity, though, an emerging message from the most recent science is that exercise needn’t be exhausting to be effective for the brain. When a group of 120 older men and women were assigned to walking or stretching programs for a major 2011 study, the walkers wound up with larger hippocampi after a year. Meanwhile, the stretchers lost volume to normal atrophy. The walkers also displayed higher levels of B.D.N.F. in their bloodstreams than the stretching group and performed better on cognitive tests.

In effect, the researchers concluded, the walkers had regained two years or more of hippocampal youth. Sixty-five-year-olds had achieved the brains of 63-year-olds simply by walking, which is encouraging news for anyone worried that what we’re all facing as we move into our later years is a life of slow (or not so slow) mental decline.

Gretchen Reynolds writes the Phys Ed column for The Times’s Well blog. Her book, ‘‘The First 20 Minutes,’’ about the science of exercise, will be published this month.

Editor: Ilena Silverman

Article: Robert Shiller's Mission to Redeem Finance - Faculty - The Chronicle of Higher Education

Robert Shiller's Mission to Redeem Finance - Faculty - The Chronicle of Higher Education
http://chronicle.com/article/Robert-Shillers-Mission-to/131456/


By Dan Berrett

Among the members of the rogues’ gallery blamed for the crash of the economy in 2008, none have worn the black hat of villainy quite as convincingly as greedy financiers.

Robert J. Shiller, however, sees them and their field in shades of gray.

“It’s kind of a mythology that’s developed around finance,” says Mr. Shiller, a behavioral economist, professor at Yale University, and teacher of many future financiers. Rapacious Wall Street types, he says, may make handy bad guys in the movies. “The problem is, we can’t live in a mythic world. We have to live in the real world.”

And in the real world, Mr. Shiller argues in his new book, Finance and the Good Society (Princeton University Press), finance is a powerful and necessary tool to keep society running.

It is the architecture that allows people to reach their goals, such as paying for college or starting a business, and to protect their assets throughout their lives.

Finance’s architects and stewards pervade the work force, as Shiller sees it. They include such obvious examples as investment bankers, mortgage lenders, and financial engineers, as well as those who do not work in finance on a daily basis, but still influence it: policy makers, philanthropists, and economists. To characterize such a broad cross-section of people and their professions as blighting the economy simply makes no sense, as Mr. Shiller sees it, even if some of them made very bad choices, particularly before the economic crash.

“I never felt, as did so many, that these problems were a damning indictment of our entire financial system,” he writes. “Imperfect as our financial system is, I still find myself admiring it for what it does, and imagining how much more impressive it can be in the future.”

And the best way to make finance more impressive, he argues, is not to restrain innovation or to discourage the invention of new financial instruments, but to encourage further experiments.

Such experimentation, he continues, should be tied to a larger goal of making finance more humane, democratic, and inclusive, in support of what he calls the Good Society.

For example, a nation could create an inequality index instead of legislating fixed income-tax rates. Under such an index, a government would devise a formula that tied tax rates to statistical measures of pre-tax inequality. If incomes were to grow more disparate, tax rates would automatically become more progressive. It would serve as a kind of insurance policy against inequality.

Mr. Shiller also cites other people’s ideas, including social-policy bonds, a proposal by the New Zealand-based economist Ronnie Horesh. Intended as a means to provide incentives for socially desirable outcomes, these bonds would be issued by governments and be redeemed when certain social-policy objectives were achieved, such as lower rates of pollution or crime.

While Mr. Shiller’s book offers a handful of similar ideas, he also takes pains to defend the actions and character of those who work in finance, a system that he argues rewards people of moral purpose. The notion that businesses are prone to act immorally and aggressively, Mr. Shiller says, is an illusion.

“This assumption, if left unchallenged, will create resentment toward business that will inhibit its proper functioning,” he writes, “thus threatening to slow the advance of the world’s prosperity in coming years.”

‘Two Shillers’

For those who know Mr. Shiller as the Cassandra who predicted the bursting of the dot-com bubble in his book Irrational Exuberance and the subprime crisis in that book’s second edition, such defenses of finance may be disconcerting.

Indeed, he stunned some listeners when he delivered the plenary speech at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association in January. He argued that concerns about rising inequality, as expressed by protesters aligned with Occupy Wall Street who demonstrated outside the conference, could be resolved by approaches like those he outlines in his new book.

Mr. Shiller also appeared to defend the high salaries paid to financial executives. “Unequal pay of executives is part of our society,” he said. “We should be careful about modifying it.”

The audience was fairly shocked, says Martha A. Starr, an associate professor of economics at American University, who introduced him that evening. But his faith in the virtues of the financial system is not as big a departure as it may seem to those who have watched Shiller’s career.

“There have always been two Shillers,” Ms. Starr says.

The first Shiller, she says, is the behavioral economist who has cautioned that unpredictable human choices can muddy rational thinking and render economic models less predictable in the real world than they might appear on paper. It is that Shiller who sees the connection between human foibles and the existence of stock-market and housing bubbles.

The other Shiller, Ms. Starr says, is the visionary who sees financial markets as holding the potential to fix social problems, if only they could be fully developed and left alone to innovate. It is this other Shiller, the one also in evidence in his 1998 book Macro Markets: Creating Institutions for Managing Society’s Largest Economic Risks, whose thinking guides his new book.

The problem, says Ms. Starr, is that in Finance and the Good Society, Mr. Shiller offers an “optimistic and utopian view of finance,” which the events of the last few years have called into question.

“In some ways, there’s a missed opportunity here to bring the two strands of his thinking together,” she says. “People are hesitant to come out in front with an opinion of his book, in part because the things they might say are a critique of the second Shiller, which they have to factor in with their extraordinary admiration for the first Shiller.”

Reviewers have also noted the way Mr. Shiller’s new book reveals contradictions in his thinking. James Pressley, writing for Bloomberg News, lauded Mr. Shiller for being both a pragmatist and a visionary. But he also faulted him for veering close to naïveté in defending finance even as fresh outrages keep emerging. Mr. Pressley’s review appeared last month, just days after a Goldman Sachs employee resigned on the op-ed page of The New York Times, chastising the firm for what he called its “toxic and destructive” environment and for the contempt its junior analysts showed for their clients, except for the profits that could be extracted from them.

“If he hasn’t already done so, Lloyd Blankfein should dash off a thank-you note to Robert Shiller,” Mr. Pressley wrote, referring to the chief executive of Goldman Sachs.

Similarly, Robin Harding of the Financial Times praised Mr. Shiller for being “wonderfully persuasive” in refusing to play down Wall Street’s problems. But he too faulted the economist for dismissing concerns about finance with an “airy wave,” and for assuming that financial innovations automatically help to improve society.

“If collateralized debt obligations and subprime mortgages have told us anything,” Mr. Harding wrote, “it is surely the reverse: The natural tendency of financial innovation is toward complexity, exploitation, and crisis.”

Mr. Shiller acknowledges his own uncertainties about whether he struck the proper tone, and he concedes that financiers who truly merit criticism may use his book for cover. “That is a concern of mine,” he says. “I don’t know if I did it right. Maybe I was too positive.”

And he responds to criticism that he is inconsistent by saying his work acknowledges two realities: The financial sector drives much of the world economy, and bubbles exist. “Reconciling these two realities in one theory is difficult, and offends people who want to see simple answers,” he says. “I want my students to know the truth, which is messy and does not allow any simple, all-embracing theory.”

Mr. Shiller’s tendency toward nuance and iconoclasm may explain the odd position in which his book may unintentionally put him. Views of finance have grown highly polarized, and they have changed quickly.

He began writing his book after the financial crisis set in, but before Occupy Wall Street helped to define the financial sector’s high-flyers as members of the 1 percent versus the 99 percent.

In 2009, one year after the financial crisis hit, anger was concentrated on the “unreasonable” salaries of financial executives, an Ipsos poll found. Two years later, Gallup said that Americans were more than twice as likely to blame the government than Wall Street for the nation’s economic woes.

This year, however, after inequality became a fixture in public discussions, the Pew Research Center saw evidence of increasing class tension. About two-thirds of respondents said that conflicts between the rich and poor had grown “very strong” or “strong,” a 19-percentage-point increase since 2009.

Today Mr. Shiller speaks approvingly of some of the goals of Occupy Wall Street. He worries about rising inequality and describes financiers as existing in a separate caste, troublingly apart from the rest of society.

At the same time, he worries about public anger boiling over into destructiveness. In this sense, the voice of the first Shiller is the one prevailing—except that, when he cautions against the dangers of groupthink, he is aiming at public opinion instead of irrational exuberance.

“We may be at a time when the people reclaim their economy,” he says. “That doesn’t mean punishing finance or refusing to go into finance. It means expanding it and making it inclusive.”

An Eye on the Future

When Mr. Shiller makes reference to those who refuse to go into finance, he has his primary audience in mind: his students at Yale, where he has taught for 30 years, including 25 teaching a class on financial markets. He intended his new book for those students, and he based much of his book on his lectures for that class.

Yale has been a prime feeder of young talent to Wall Street for decades. Since 1975, about one-quarter of each class of Yale graduates has consistently gone on to work in finance, according to the university’s office of institutional research, though this number dropped to 14 percent in 2010.

But there and at other campuses, students have started debating whether they should work for financial firms after graduation. In November, 25 Yale students protested outside an information session offered near the campus by the financial-services firm Morgan Stanley. Students say that many consulting and financial firms recruit them by appealing to their idealism, telling students that working at these companies will prepare them for advancing the public good in the future.

The intent of the protests was to prompt students who enter finance to think hard about whether it is what they truly want for themselves or whether they are simply making an easy choice, says Marina E. Keegan, a senior majoring in English. In the campus newspaper, Ms. Keegan lamented how many of her classmates enter finance, and she helped organize the protests.

“I don’t see it as a very productive use of the skills, passion, and creativity of the people that I know,” Ms. Keegan says, describing classmates who work in the arts or advance social-justice causes while they are on campus, but then gravitate to finance, with its large starting salaries, after they leave. “I think it’s a huge talent suck.”

Duck Ju Kang, a senior majoring in economics and a research assistant for Mr. Shiller’s book, says the debate on campus about finance has grown more heated this academic year.

“It affects you when there are 400 kids on the campus telling you you’re just evil and you don’t do anything for society,” says Mr. Kang, who was an intern last summer for a hedge fund and plans to work as an investor after he graduates, “but then I don’t believe that at all.”

Some students in Mr. Shiller’s financial-markets class, which is an upper-level elective, agree that many Yale graduates who enter finance do so because they are unsure about what else to do. “It’s automatic brand recognition,” says Rachel Wang, a senior majoring in economics who was also one of his research assistants.

And, while she sympathizes with the critiques leveled by Occupy Wall Street, Ms. Wang says those arguments tend to oversimplify. “You have to distinguish between finance as a field and specific people who make bad decisions.”

Ms. Wang hopes to bring her analytical and financial skills to work for a firm specializing in clean energy, a position that would help her fulfill Mr. Shiller’s vision of finance serving the good society. “You can absolutely go into finance and retain what you’re passionate about,” she says.

That perspective was echoed by Mark D. White, professor and chair of the department of political science, economics, and philosophy at the City University of New York’s College of Staten Island, who studies ethics and economics.

He concedes, though, that recent graduates who enter finance are more likely to find themselves working at big firms where they may have little contact with their clients, and that those sorts of jobs can insulate people from the consequences of their decisions.

Students who are unhappy with the way finance operates should seek to enter the field and change it, he says. “Rather than protest them, join them.”

But that line of argument is naïve, say some Yale protesters. Alexandra Z. Brodsky, a senior majoring in ethics, politics, and economics who helped organize the protests, says she is happy that Mr. Shiller’s book discusses the need to democratize finance, but she worries how much such an effort can succeed when it seems to run counter to the purpose of finance, which is profit-making.

“I’d like to think that an idealistic twenty-something could go in and revolutionize the system,” she says. “At the same time, I don’t know how that would work. It’s a huge system with the express goal of making a lot of money.”

That, ultimately, may be where Mr. Shiller disagrees most with students at Yale. As he sees it, finance is simply a technology. Its goal is not to make money, but to serve societal goals.

Distinctions of this sort can easily get lost amid heated rhetoric about finance, says Mr. White, of Staten Island. “Discussion these days about anything tends to be polarized,” he says. “I don’t think someone trying to be nuanced and hit all the bases is likely to succeed. Someone of Shiller’s stature may get listened to more.”


Social Security Secret: How to Add Thousands to Retired Clients’ Incomes

http://www.advisorone.com/2012/02/29/social-security-secret-how-to-add-thousands-to-ret#.T1N-_ZU38nM.mailto

Social Security Secret: How to Add Thousands to Retired Clients’ Incomes

Evensky Katz advisor Brett Horowitz reveals how extra income can be gained by applying little known Social Security Administration rules


With retirement clients lucky to get a 1% annual percentage yield on their deposits these days, and stock market swings at historic levels of volatility, delivering real value-added to clients is no easy feat.

Yet Brett Horowitz of the well-known wealth management firm Evensky Katz has done just that with research that shows how clients can gain tens of thousands of dollars in extra retirement income by applying little known Social Security Administration rules.

Horowitz has developed an analytical tool that can run hundreds of scenarios to help clients choose the financial outcome most beneficial to them. In a recent presentation to clients of the Coral Gables, Fla.-based firm he detailed two examples that each drop more than $40,000 extra in a retired couple’s laps.

In the first scenario, a husband and wife both have similar earnings but the higher earning husband plans to delay receiving Social Security benefits until he is 70 (thus accruing credit that will boost his monthly income). The wife meanwhile will start taking her Social Security benefits at age 62 (thus receiving less than the full benefit that kicks in at age 66).

Most retirees likely assume the husband in this scenario is prudently delaying his retirement to maximize their retirement income without appreciating that the husband is entitled to claim spousal benefits while continuing to accrue deferral credits.

By filing a “restricted application,” the husband will receive 50% of his wife’s Social Security income for each month he delays claiming his own benefit (but only after his wife turns 66). In Horowitz’s illustration, such a filing entitles the husband to half his wife’s $1,750 a month–or $875 a month during the four years during which the wife is collecting benefits but the husband is not. (This illustration assumes husband and wife are both 66, so there are four years during which he can earn spousal benefits while earning earning deferral credits of his own).

That’s $42,000 in found money. (Of course, these numbers could vary a great deal based on how much Social Security credit a person has accumulated.)

That particular strategy works well when the early-retiring spouse is entitled to a reasonably high income. Horowitz recommends another technique when the retiring spouse is entitled to a low monthly income of, say, $100. In this second scenario–assuming the husband, again, is a high earner delaying retirement till 70 and the wife has reached her full retirement age of 66–the husband should “file and suspend.” That is, he should file for his higher level of benefits but suspend his receipt of the benefits.

This entitles his low-earning wife to claim spousal benefits. If he would be earning $2,000 a month and she $100 a month, she can now claim half his benefits ($1,000) minus her benefit ($100) for a $900 monthly benefit. Under this scenario, the husband continues to earn deferral credits till age 70 while the wife collects an additional $43,200 in additional benefits.

Horowitz warns that the Social Security Administration is more restrictive these days about allowing filing changes so it is imperative that retiring clients think through their strategy before submitting their benefit claims.

Article: FRBSF Economic Letter: Government Spending: An Economic Boost? (2012-04, 2/6/2012)

FRBSF Economic Letter: Government Spending: An Economic Boost? (2012-04, 2/6/2012)
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2012/el2012-04.html


 

Economic Research

2012-04

February 6, 2012

Government Spending: An Economic Boost?

By Daniel J. Wilson

The severe global economic downturn and the large stimulus programs that governments in many countries adopted in response have generated a resurgence in research on the effects of fiscal policy. One key lesson emerging from this research is that there is no single fiscal multiplier that sums up the economic impact of fiscal policy. Rather, the impact varies widely depending on the specific fiscal policies put into effect and the overall economic environment.

Over the past three years, there has been a resurgence in economic research on the impacts of fiscal policy, as implemented through direct government spending and tax rates. This resurgence is due in large part to the severe global economic downturn and the massive fiscal stimulus programs put in place in many countries as a response. Now, as many countries pivot from stimulus to austerity despite uncertain recovery, the question of the economic effects of higher taxes and reductions in government spending takes on a new importance.

This Economic Letter reviews recent research on the economic effects of fiscal policy. This research makes clear that many factors can affect the size and direction of fiscal effects, suggesting that policymakers must carefully consider the specific context of fiscal policy to understand the probable effects of new spending and tax initiatives.

The fiscal multiplier?

The economic analysis of the effects of fiscal policy typically focuses on what is called the fiscal multiplier. The most common definition of it is the magnitude of the change in economic activity caused by a change in fiscal policy. For example, a GDP fiscal spending multiplier of 1.5 means that a $1 increase in government spending leads to a $1.50 increase in GDP.

The term multiplier refers to the broad effects of government spending and taxes on overall economic activity, not just on those households or businesses directly targeted by fiscal policy. For instance, increased government spending on highways may affect not only highway construction companies, but also the retailers frequented by newly employed highway workers, local asphalt providers, and nonlocal steel and equipment producers. Moreover, the current or future financing of the increased government spending may affect the savings and investment decisions of households and businesses throughout the economy. Similarly, a tax cut affects not only those who pay the tax, but also all areas of the economy that depend on the spending of those taxpayers or are influenced by future policy changes required to pay for the tax cut.

The use of the fiscal multiplier as an analytical device has helped ensure that theoretical analyses consider both the direct and indirect effects of fiscal policy. However, the concept arguably has led the economics profession down the false path of posing the misleading question, “What is the fiscal multiplier?” A central theme of recent work on fiscal policy’s impact has been that there is no single fiscal multiplier. Rather, the impact of policy varies over time and across geographic areas. How this plays out depends at a minimum on the type of fiscal policy, that is, taxes versus spending, government purchases versus transfers, government investment versus consumption; its financing; how quickly it is implemented; what monetary policy is in place; and the state of the business cycle.

Theoretical guidance

Within the economics literature, two broad frameworks are used to understand the effects of fiscal policy. The Neoclassical model emphasizes the distortionary effects of government spending. The New Keynesian framework highlights the potential role of government spending in alleviating factors that prevent the private economy from making rapid adjustments to economic shocks. In the standard Neoclassical model, changes in fiscal policy affect the economy primarily through labor supply, at least in the short run (see Ramey 2011a). Government spending is viewed as a negative wealth shock to households because they recognize that taxes must rise either now or in the future to pay for it. This induces more people to enter the labor force, increasing output. Counterintuitively, the more distortionary the tax system is, the bigger the positive impact of government spending on output. That’s because the distortions add to the negative wealth shock, prompting larger increases in labor supply. In this model, government spending is inherently wasteful. The spending has no direct effect either on the welfare of individuals or on the productivity of private businesses.

Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010) explore the implications of three departures from this standard Neoclassical framework. First, they consider government investment spending, such as on infrastructure. Such government investment increases the productivity of private businesses, potentially altering the fiscal multiplier both in the short and long run. Second, they consider the importance of lags between when fiscal policy changes are legislated and when they go into effect. They find that such lags can greatly reduce the short-run impact of the spending. Third, they find that distortionary taxation to finance government investment can reduce its long-run impact.

New Keynesian models differ in that they generally assume some degree of stickiness, that is, that wages and prices do not adjust instantly to economic shocks. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) develop such a model to study how the fiscal multiplier varies along a number of dimensions. Their baseline model yields a GDP fiscal spending multiplier that is constant over time and equal to about 1.0. The multiplier varies only modestly when most parameters are changed, such as the degree of price or wage stickiness. However, the multiplier varies enormously depending on how monetary policy reacts to the economy. In particular, the multiplier can be above 3 when monetary policy is fixed, such as when the central bank’s interest rate target is stuck near its lower bound of zero.

Empirical estimates

Over the past few decades, the standard approach to estimating the impact of fiscal policy has generally been to investigate correlations over time between government spending or taxes and economic performance at the national level. Beginning with the seminal paper of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), economists have increasingly used a statistical technique known as structural vector autoregression (SVAR) to estimate the relationships between government spending and other economic variables over time, while imposing certain assumptions suggested by economic theory. Blanchard and Perotti’s key assumption was that government spending responds to economic shocks with a lag. This assumption allows researchers to identify the movements in government spending that would not have been expected, given the usual way government spending responds to economic shocks, and then estimate how GDP and other economic variables react to those movements. Blanchard and Perotti and other researchers using the SVAR approach have tended to find multipliers that are near or less than one, both for government spending and for tax cuts.

More recently, a number of time-series studies have sought to avoid the strong assumptions underlying Blanchard and Perotti’s approach by building models that incorporate evidence from contemporary forecasts, news media, and government reports on unexpected changes in government spending or taxes. Using this approach, Ramey (2011b) finds that the multiplier on government defense spending is between 0.6 and 1.2 at its peak. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) provide an interesting variant on this approach. They allow the multiplier to differ in recessions and expansions. They find the long-run effect to be positive and as high as 2.5 in recessions, but as low as near –1.0 in expansions.

Several recent papers have used variations in government spending across regions, such as states or counties, to identify the effects of fiscal policy. These studies take advantage of the fact that large portions of federal spending are often allocated to regions for reasons unrelated to regional economic performance or needs. For example, federal highway grants are distributed to states based primarily on legislated formulas that rely on noneconomic factors, such as the layout of the interstate highway system. Such variations can be used to identify the effects of federal spending on a local economy. How these local effects relate to the national effects of federal spending depends on whether there are spillover effects to other regions, which could be positive or negative depending on patterns of trade and labor mobility, and the ways local governments may influence how the money is spent.

Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) exploit the fact that a given percentage change in U.S. military spending generally translates into much larger changes in such states as California and Virginia. They use this variation to identify the portion of each state’s military spending that is independent of its current economic conditions and then estimate the effect of such independent spending on state GDP. They derive a local GDP multiplier of 1.5 over two years. Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010) estimate a GDP multiplier using variations in federal spending across states during the Great Depression. They obtain a local multiplier as high as 1.7.

Similarly, Wilson (forthcoming) looks at the local impact of federal spending from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), estimating the extent to which cross-state differences in employment can be explained by differences in ARRA spending. The study exploits the fact that much ARRA funding was allocated to states based on formulas that relied on factors unrelated to state economic conditions. For example, the extent of a state’s highway infrastructure in 2006 was part of the formula determining that state’s share of ARRA highway funds in 2009. Wilson finds a strong correlation between ARRA spending based on these independent sources of variation and post-ARRA employment growth, with the effects starting around the summer of 2009 and continuing at least through the first quarter of 2011. The magnitude of this employment response is consistent with a local GDP multiplier of around 1.5.

Conclusion

What does this literature tell policymakers and others trying to assess the impact of fiscal policy changes? It is an inconvenient reality that this literature provides an enormous range of multiplier estimates, ranging from –1 to 3. However, this range is not so much a reflection of disagreement over an underlying parameter as it is a reflection of one of the key lessons of this research—that there is no single multiplier that can be applied mechanically to all situations. The impact depends on the type of fiscal policy changes in question and the environment in which they are implemented. The effects of government investment are potentially greater than those of other types of government spending. And the effects from transfers to people without much wealth or ability to borrow are probably higher than from transfers to others. The impact depends on how policy changes affect expectations of future government spending and taxes. It also depends on how quickly the changes are implemented and whether they were anticipated before they were authorized. Moreover, the impact varies depending on whether monetary policy counteracts or complements fiscal policy. Finally, it depends on the state of the business cycle. Effects are more positive during recessions. An important lesson from the research is that it’s essential to clearly understand the context in which fiscal policy is operating, that is, the factors that may cause economic effects and the size of the multiplier to vary.

Daniel J. Wilson is a senior economist in the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

References

Auerbach, Alan J., and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. 2010. “Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 16311.

Blanchard, Olivier, and Roberto Perotti. 2002. “An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), pp. 1329–1368.

Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. 2011. “When Is the Government Spending Multiplier Large?” Journal of Political Economy 119(1), pp. 78–121.

Fishback, Price V., and Valentina Kachanovskaya. 2010. “In Search of the Multiplier for Federal Spending in the States during the New Deal.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 16561.

Leeper, Eric M., Todd B. Walker, and Shu-Chun Susan Yang. 2010. “Government Investment and Fiscal Stimulus.” Journal of Monetary Economics 57(8), pp. 1000–1012.

Nakamura, Emi, and Jon Steinsson. 2011. “Fiscal Stimulus in a Monetary Union: Evidence from U.S. Regions.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 17391.

Ramey, Valerie A. 2011a. “Can Government Purchases Stimulate the Economy?” Journal of Economic Literature 49(3), pp. 673–685.

Ramey, Valerie A. 2011b. “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the Timing.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(1), pp. 1–50.

Wilson, Daniel J. Forthcoming. “Fiscal Spending Jobs Multipliers: Evidence from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.” Forthcoming in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. FRBSF Working Paper 2010-17.

WSJ: Americans Stumble on Math of Big Issues

WSJ: Americans Stumble on Math of Big Issues

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203471004577144632919979666.html

Many Americans have strong opinions about policy issues shaping the presidential campaign, from immigration to Social Security. But their grasp of numbers that underlie those issues can be tenuous.

Americans vastly overestimate the percentage of fellow residents who are foreign-born, by more than a factor of two, and the percentage who are in the country illegally, by a factor of six or seven. They overestimate spending on foreign aid by a factor of 25, according to a 2010 survey. And more than two-thirds of those who responded to a 2010 Zogby online poll underestimated the part of the federal budget that goes to Social Security or Medicare and Medicaid.

"It's pretty apparent that Americans routinely don't know objective facts about the government," says Joshua Clinton, a political scientist at Vanderbilt University.

Americans' numerical misapprehension can be traced to a range of factors, including where they live, the news they consume, the political rhetoric they hear and even the challenges of numbers themselves. And it isn't even clear how much this matters: Telling people the right numbers often doesn't change their views.

This isn't exclusively an American problem. Estimates by people in the U.K., Italy and France of immigrant populations in their nation miss by a bigger percentage than do Americans' estimates, and Britons overstated the magnitude of U.K. net contributions to the European Union by more than 100 times in a 2010 survey.

Some of these findings may show simply that people don't have a good grasp on very small or large numbers. Take a poll last year that found Americans overestimated federal spending on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting by a factor of at least 100. Arthur Lupia, a political scientist at the University of Michigan, says while Americans were far off the mark, the average response of 1% to 5% signals "that lots of people know that the amount spent is a small number." CPB was budgeted $430 million last year, 0.01% of federal outlays.

"Numbers are hard," says Ellen Peters, a psychologist at Ohio State University. "They're difficult to evaluate and remember because they're abstract symbols," and their meaning shifts depending on the context. And absorbing policy numbers may not be worth the effort: "People are more likely to remember numbers accurately when that information is more valuable to them," Ms. Peters says.

Pollsters and political scientists say people, when asked to estimate national figures, can place undue weight on their immediate surroundings. Someone who lives near many foreign-born people might exaggerate the national foreign-born population.

Even when polls have a narrower scope, respondents aren't necessarily on firmer ground. A telephone poll last year of 2,004 Californians by the Public Policy Institute of California found that they didn't know much about how their state government was spending its money.

Nearly half of respondents named prisons and corrections as the top state expenditure among four available choices, while just 16% named education. In fact, education was the leading state expenditure, with prisons getting about a quarter the funds that education does.

Correcting misconceptions may not change peoples' beliefs about the underlying issues, according to several studies for which researchers tested the effect of supplying the right numbers. That finding is corroborated by psychological research suggesting that people struggle to identify their reasons for forming opinions, instead supplying ex post facto rationalizations—such as faulty numbers.

This undermines the notion of rational choice, but also weakens any case these findings might support for a poll quiz or mandatory civics education: The truth may not change the outcome.

"People recall facts that support their beliefs, and don't recall facts that contradict beliefs," says Leo Simonetta, a social psychologist and director of analytics for the Art & Science Group, a Baltimore-based education consultancy.

When researchers provide study respondents with corrected figures and ask them to re-evaluate their opinion on issues, there generally isn't a big shift. And any lasting effects—when study participants returned to their usual media diet and peer group—likely would be even slighter.

"We found that people resisted any attempts to give them accurate information," says James Kuklinski, a political scientist at the University of Illinois.

He and colleagues asked Illinois residents for their opinions and factual beliefs on welfare. More than 60% supplied an estimate of the percentage of U.S. families on welfare that was more than double the correct proportion, among other misfires. Those most misinformed were most confident in their estimates, according to the 2000 paper. And a subgroup supplied with the right numbers didn't change their views in a meaningful way.

A recent immigration study confirmed the finding. Political scientists John Sides of George Washington University and Jack Citrin of the University of California, Berkeley, hypothesized in a working paper that supplying Americans, who typically overestimate the number of immigrants and illegal immigrants among them, with correct numbers would reduce the perceived threat of immigration and change their views. Instead, getting the right number reinforced their views, and even increased their support for letting fewer immigrants into the U.S

NYT: Harder for Americans to Rise From Lower Rungs

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/harder-for-americans-to-rise-from-lower-rungs.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print

Harder for Americans to Rise From Lower Rungs

WASHINGTON — Benjamin Franklin did it. Henry Ford did it. And American life is built on the faith that others can do it, too: rise from humble origins to economic heights. “Movin’ on up,” George Jefferson-style, is not only a sitcom song but a civil religion.

But many researchers have reached a conclusion that turns conventional wisdom on its head: Americans enjoy less economic mobility than their peers in Canada and much of Western Europe. The mobility gap has been widely discussed in academic circles, but a sour season of mass unemployment and street protests has moved the discussion toward center stage.

Former Senator Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania, a Republican candidate for president, warned this fall that movement “up into the middle income is actually greater, the mobility in Europe, than it is in America.” National Review, a conservative thought leader, wrote that “most Western European and English-speaking nations have higher rates of mobility.” Even Representative Paul D. Ryan, a Wisconsin Republican who argues that overall mobility remains high, recently wrote that “mobility from the very bottom up” is “where the United States lags behind.”

Liberal commentators have long emphasized class, but the attention on the right is largely new.

“It’s becoming conventional wisdom that the U.S. does not have as much mobility as most other advanced countries,” said Isabel V. Sawhill, an economist at the Brookings Institution. “I don’t think you’ll find too many people who will argue with that.”

One reason for the mobility gap may be the depth of American poverty, which leaves poor children starting especially far behind. Another may be the unusually large premiums that American employers pay for college degrees. Since children generally follow their parents’ educational trajectory, that premium increases the importance of family background and stymies people with less schooling.

At least five large studies in recent years have found the United States to be less mobile than comparable nations. A project led by Markus Jantti, an economist at a Swedish university, found that 42 percent of American men raised in the bottom fifth of incomes stay there as adults. That shows a level of persistent disadvantage much higher than in Denmark (25 percent) and Britain (30 percent) — a country famous for its class constraints.

Meanwhile, just 8 percent of American men at the bottom rose to the top fifth. That compares with 12 percent of the British and 14 percent of the Danes.

Despite frequent references to the United States as a classless society, about 62 percent of Americans (male and female) raised in the top fifth of incomes stay in the top two-fifths, according to research by the Economic Mobility Project of the Pew Charitable Trusts. Similarly, 65 percent born in the bottom fifth stay in the bottom two-fifths.

By emphasizing the influence of family background, the studies not only challenge American identity but speak to the debate about inequality. While liberals often complain that the United States has unusually large income gaps, many conservatives have argued that the system is fair because mobility is especially high, too: everyone can climb the ladder. Now the evidence suggests that America is not only less equal, but also less mobile.

John Bridgeland, a former aide to President George W. Bush who helped start Opportunity Nation, an effort to seek policy solutions, said he was “shocked” by the international comparisons. “Republicans will not feel compelled to talk about income inequality,” Mr. Bridgeland said. “But they will feel a need to talk about a lack of mobility — a lack of access to the American Dream.”

While Europe differs from the United States in culture and demographics, a more telling comparison may be with Canada, a neighbor with significant ethnic diversity. Miles Corak, an economist at the University of Ottawa, found that just 16 percent of Canadian men raised in the bottom tenth of incomes stayed there as adults, compared with 22 percent of Americans. Similarly, 26 percent of American men raised at the top tenth stayed there, but just 18 percent of Canadians.

“Family background plays more of a role in the U.S. than in most comparable countries,” Professor Corak said in an interview.

Skeptics caution that the studies measure “relative mobility” — how likely children are to move from their parents’ place in the income distribution. That is different from asking whether they have more money. Most Americans have higher incomes than their parents because the country has grown richer.

Some conservatives say this measure, called absolute mobility, is a better gauge of opportunity. A Pew study found that 81 percent of Americans have higher incomes than their parents (after accounting for family size). There is no comparable data on other countries.

Since they require two generations of data, the studies also omit immigrants, whose upward movement has long been considered an American strength. “If America is so poor in economic mobility, maybe someone should tell all these people who still want to come to the U.S.,” said Stuart M. Butler, an analyst at the Heritage Foundation.

The income compression in rival countries may also make them seem more mobile. Reihan Salam, a writer for The Daily and National Review Online, has calculated that a Danish family can move from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile with $45,000 of additional earnings, while an American family would need an additional $93,000.

Even by measures of relative mobility, Middle America remains fluid. About 36 percent of Americans raised in the middle fifth move up as adults, while 23 percent stay on the same rung and 41 percent move down, according to Pew research. The “stickiness” appears at the top and bottom, as affluent families transmit their advantages and poor families stay trapped.

While Americans have boasted of casting off class since Poor Richard’s Almanac, until recently there has been little data.

Pioneering work in the early 1980s by Gary S. Becker, a Nobel laureate in economics, found only a mild relationship between fathers’ earnings and those of their sons. But when better data became available a decade later, another prominent economist, Gary Solon, found the bond twice as strong. Most researchers now estimate the “elasticity” of father-son earnings at 0.5, which means if one man earns $100,000 more than another, his sons would earn $50,000 more on average than the sons of the poorer man.

In 2006 Professor Corak reviewed more than 50 studies of nine countries. He ranked Canada, Norway, Finland and Denmark as the most mobile, with the United States and Britain roughly tied at the other extreme. Sweden, Germany, and France were scattered across the middle.

The causes of America’s mobility problem are a topic of dispute — starting with the debates over poverty. The United States maintains a thinner safety net than other rich countries, leaving more children vulnerable to debilitating hardships.

Poor Americans are also more likely than foreign peers to grow up with single mothers. That places them at an elevated risk of experiencing poverty and related problems, a point frequently made by Mr. Santorum, who surged into contention in the Iowa caucuses. The United States also has uniquely high incarceration rates, and a longer history of racial stratification than its peers.

“The bottom fifth in the U.S. looks very different from the bottom fifth in other countries,” said Scott Winship, a researcher at the Brookings Institution, who wrote the article for National Review. “Poor Americans have to work their way up from a lower floor.”

A second distinguishing American trait is the pay tilt toward educated workers. While in theory that could help poor children rise — good learners can become high earners — more often it favors the children of the educated and affluent, who have access to better schools and arrive in them more prepared to learn.

“Upper-income families can invest more in their children’s education and they may have a better understanding of what it takes to get a good education,” said Eric Wanner, president of the Russell Sage Foundation, which gives grants to social scientists.

The United States is also less unionized than many of its peers, which may lower wages among the least skilled, and has public health problems, like obesity and diabetes, which can limit education and employment.

Perhaps another brake on American mobility is the sheer magnitude of the gaps between rich and the rest — the theme of the Occupy Wall Street protests, which emphasize the power of the privileged to protect their interests. Countries with less equality generally have less mobility.

Mr. Salam recently wrote that relative mobility “is overrated as a social policy goal” compared with raising incomes across the board. Parents naturally try to help their children, and a completely mobile society would mean complete insecurity: anyone could tumble any time.

But he finds the stagnation at the bottom alarming and warns that it will worsen. Most of the studies end with people born before 1970, while wage gaps, single motherhood and incarceration increased later. Until more recent data arrives, he said, “we don’t know the half of it.”

Harpers: Stop payment! A homeowners’ revolt against the banks

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